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COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A NOTE ON
REVIEW OF DISCRETION
FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX t
During the past century, industrialization proceeded primarily on
the formula of free opportunity and individual management. A fully
developed industrial order, on the other hand, can find the rationale of
its existence and managerial orientation only in its relationship to the
national community at large. Authoritative definition of this relationship is essential to both the security of investment and the stability of
the social system. The definition is supplied in government regulation.
The scope of government regulation is bound to increase as the
emergent industrial society approximates integration. Effective government regulation cannot rely on statutory guidance alone. Resort
to administrative power is required in order to transform the general
norm into behavior patterns. Public administration is a "fitting"
process, combining subservience to authorization with creative adjustment.
These are, in a nutshell, the dominant factors conditioning the
modern "service state".' More than ten years ago, Ernst Freund
observed here and abroad "a growing tendency to have recourse to
administrative powers . . ."-independent of any "bureaucratic tradition". 2 The far-reaching reform measures adopted under the
auspices of the New Deal have placed the trend in sharp relief. As a
"fitting" process, public administration cannot fulfill its function without the use of discretion. In consequence, adequate control of administrative discretion is today a matter of vital concern to the citizen
affected by administrative acts. 3 Equally vital is the community interest in preventing discretion from transgressing its legal mandate.
IJ.D., 1922, University of Hamburg, Germany; Assistant Professor of Government, Harvard University.
I. WTE TRENDS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1933) 341.

2. FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY (1928) 580.
This tendency, as an inherent necessity of the "service state" must be distinguished
from the ascendancy of executive leadership within the framework of constitutional
government. The latter development testifies to the increasing prominence of the planning function (policy formulation) and the difficulties attending the discharge of this
function by parliamentary bodies. Cf. GIRAUD, LA CRISE DE LA D]iIOCRATIE ET LE RENFORCEMENT DU FOUVoIR EXPCUTIF (1938) ; Loewenstein, The Balance between Legislative and Executive Power: A Study in Comparative ConstitutionalLaw (1938) 5 U.
OF CL L. REV. 566. This does not mean that both trends are entirely unrelated to one
arnother. Cf. Morstein Marx, Verwaltungsreforin in den Vereinigten. Staaten (1933)
38 VERWALTUNGSARCnIV 63 et seq. One of the best illustrations is the REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT (1937). A British paral-

is the REPORT (CMD. 4060) OF THE COMMITTEE ON MINISTERS' POWERS (1932).
3. The problem extends far beyond the sphere of the so-called independent regulatory commissions. To concentrate on a solution for this specific province-as does
lel

LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938)-may jeopardize
(954)

the desirable unity of
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Continental European administrative law has attempted to accomplish both these ends. Under the circumstances, comparative
analysis should prove fruitful. As the pressure toward a fuller
utilization of administrative power appears to be inherent in the growth
of industrial organization, techniques of accommodation elaborated
abroad at an earlier date have acquired a new relevance in our own
quest for a solution. Systematic treatment of French and German
administrative law has received a strong impetus.4 The merit of such
systematic examination cannot be in doubt. The approach, however,
needs implementation in terms of comparative case analysis focusing
on specific legal situations. It is the purpose of this article to suggest
the potentialities of "situational" case analysis.5 The following pages
administrative law, an objective that should gain fuller recognition in present-day discussions. The chief significance of administrative law must be found in its carry-over
effect upon the conduct of public administration as a whole. Its permeation of the "administrative mind" is more important than the fact that it supplies the legal norm
which governs the decision of a concrete dispute. Moreover, the new prominence of the
planning function (see supra note 2) makes the status of the independent regulatory
commissions distinctly problematical. Cf. Cushman, The Problem of the Independent
Regulatory Commissions, PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT,
REPORT wiTir SPECIAL STUDIES (1937); BROKINGS INSTITUTION, REPORT ON THE GovERNMENT ACTiTES IN THE REGULATION OF PRIvATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, No. 1o,
REPORT TO (SENATE) SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE EXECUTIVE AGENCIES OF
THE GOVERNMFNT, 75th Cong., ist Sess. (1937) ; Rogers, The Independent Regulatory
Commissions (1937) 52 POL. SCI. Q. 1.
4. Among the most recent literature, mention may be made of Jacoby, Delegation
of Powers and JudicialReview: A Study in Comparative Law, 4 SELECTED ESSAYS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 316; Riesenfeld, The French System of Administrative Justice:

A Model for American Law? (1938) IS B. U. L. REV. 48, 400, 715; Uhler, The Doctrine of Administrative Trespassin French Law: An Analogue of Due Process (1938)
37 M IcEr. L. REv. 2o9; Uhlman and Rupp, The German System of Administrative
Ccurts: A Contribution to the Discussion of the Proposed Federal Administrative

Court.(1937) 31 IlL. L. REV. 847, 1028.
Unfortunately, little material is available in English on Italian administrative law,
although the contribution of Italian jurisprudence to this field is important. Its comparative significance is perhaps sufficiently suggested by the fact that National Socialist
writers have come to denounce its "liberalistic extremism". Cf. IPSEN, PoLTIK UND
JUSTIz (1937) 202, n. 67. A classic in the field is I & II ZANORINI, CORSO DI DIRITTO
AMMINISTRATVO (1936-1938).
Other standard works are: BORSI, LA GIUSTIZIA AMMINISTRATIVA (6th ed. 1938) ; I & II F RARIs, DinRIo AMMINISTRATIVO (1922-1923) ;
I-X ORLANDO, ET AL., DniTTO AMMINISTRATIVO ITALIANO (1897-1936); I-III PRESUTTI,
ISTITUZIONI DI DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO ITALIANO (3d ed. 1934); RANELLETTI, LE
GUA.ENTIGIE DELLA GUISTIZIA NELLA PUBBLICA AmMINISTRAZIONE (4th ed. 1934);

LA ToRPs, ELEMENTI DI DnmTTo AMMINISTRATIVO (1925).

Continental European doc-

trine has spread not only to the Balkans but also to Latin America. Concerning the
latter cf. BIELSA, DERECHo ADINISTRATIVO Y LEGiSLACI6N ADmINISTRATIVA ARGENTINA (3d ed. 1938). Concerning the former, it may suffice to refer to KRBEK, DISrECIONA OCJENA (1937), a comprehensive discussion of judicial review of administrative
discretion by a Yugoslav scholar.
5. Continental European administrative law lends itself to "situational" case analysis because, in contrast with the tradition of codification in other areas of law, it corresponds closely to the common law pattern. Its chief characteristic is its judicial basis
-it is judge-made law. Its systematization does not rest on statutory formulation but
on the contribution of legal scholarship set forth in comprehensive treatises of individual

authors, mostly teachers of administrative law. Administrative justice recognizes
these treatises as authoritative. The intimate connection between theory and practice
has also found expression in the organization of the administrative courts. In Germany,
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are intended as a tentative outline for use by others and as a topical
comment as well.
I
In the United States, "administrative law is groping". 6 It seems
to imply a challenge to our "judicial tradition". 7 Its place within the
ideology of checks and balances is considered problematical-an
ideology proclaimed "inseparable from a well ordered society in the
English-speaking world"." At the same time, a "well ordered society"
cannot afford to be indifferent to any legal uncertainty attending the
exercise of administrative power. It is futile to eulogize the "rule of
law" if it fails to offer practical safeguards of legality in the expanding realm of relationships between administrative authority and the
individual. In the texture of these relationships, the manifestations
of quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative power as vested in the so-called
independent regulatory commissions represent no more than a number
of major threads. The case to which we turn 9 here is outside these
specific categories. It is a plain licensing case.
The Massachusetts statute governing the granting of licenses to
restaurant businesses directs "common victuallers" to be provided at
for instance, professors of public law have frequently served at the same time as members of the higher administrative courts. Thus a fruitful exchange between academic
teaching and judicial experience was achieved, comparable to the far-reaching influence
exerted by the sapientes in the resurrection and revitalization of Roman law in medieval
Italy. Cf. ENGELMANN, DIE WIEDERGEBURT DER RECHTSKULTUR IN ITALIEN (1938);
KANTOROWICZ, STUDIES IN THE GLoSSATORS OF THE ROMAN LAW (1938).

"Situational' case analysis provides opportunities for ascertaining the factual conditions confronting the administrator in making his decision. Here we discern a signifi-

cant zone of contact between administrative law and public administration. Familiarity
with the fundamental problems of administrative law is today indispensable for the
administrative officer in responsible position. The approach to public administration
would probably become more fruitful by a closer orientation to administrative law. This
idea seems to be taking hold among teachers of public administration. Cf. FIELD,
RESEARCH IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1938); Social Science Research Council, Committee on Public Administration, Legal Aspects of Public Administration (1939). In
the university training for the higher administrative career, continental European countries place emphasis on administrative law. Cf. MORSTEiN MARX, CIVIL SERVICE IN
GERMANY, CIVIL SERVICE ABROAD (1935) 210, 223 et seq.; SHARP, THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC (1938) 156 et seq. In the elaboration of administrative law

account must be taken of the need for supplying the administrator with a guide to constructive solutions. "Situational" case analysis will tend to accentuate this necessity.

6.

FRANKFURTER AND DAVISON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

(2d ed. 1935) vi.
7. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ADVANCE PROGRAM, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMmITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1938) 157.
8. Id. at 145.
g. Liggett Drug Co., Inc. v. Board of License Com'rs of City of North Adams, 4
N. E. (2d) 628 (Mass. 1936) ; J. J. Newberry Co. v. Same, ibid. See (1937) 31 ILL.
L. REV. 1089. The Liggett and Newberry companies each filed a petition for mandamus,
and a bill in equity to enjoin interference with the business. The four cases were consolidated. Decision on the bills in equity hinged on the outcome of the mandamus proceedings, and no further mention of them will be necessary. The underlying facts of
both mandamus petitions were substantially identical. The presentation of the case in
the text is based on the papers on appeal and the briefs.
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all times with "suitable food for strangers and travelers", 10 and to
have upon their premises "the necessary implements and facilities for
cooking, preparing and serving food for strangers and travelers"."'
These are the only express qualifications, apart from the obligation to
refrain from conducting the business "in an improper manner".' 2 The
statute states also that the law "shall not require the licensing authorities" to grant a license "if, in their opinion, the public good does not
require it".' 3 Petitioner, a chain-store corporation operating a large
number of stores in Massachusetts, had for several years been licensed
as a "common victualler" by the Board of License Commissioners of
the City of North Adams. Apart from the sale of merchandise, the
store maintained a soda fountain and served meals. Petitioner, against
whose business conduct there had never been complaint, filed application for the annual renewal of its license in November, 1935. On
December 14, the Board informed petitioner that it had "declined to
renew" the license.
Two days later, the North Adams Transcript carried an article
on the Board's action. The article, based on an interview with the
chairman of the Board, stated that the Board, according to its chairman, had acted to "protect big-tax-paying restaurants from the competition of establishments that are serving meals only as a side line
and that pay almost nothing in taxes toward the support of the
municipal government". The article further quoted the chairman as
saying that the enterprise, being a corporation, pays no local taxes on
real estate holdings or its stock and contributes to the support of the
city government only the small portion of its relatively light corporation taxes which the Commonwealth returns to the municipality.
"Restaurants operating solely as such, on the other hand, pay heavy
taxes locally and in many cases pay the city also the substantial fees
and charges for liquor licenses." The locally owned restaurants, "in
the light of these facts", required protection from such competition.
Such was the chairman's announcement. Petition for mandamus, after
hearing, was dismissed by the single justice "on the merits".' 4 The
justice made no findings of facts.
The Supreme Judicial Court, confronted with petitioner's bill of
exceptions, took for its point of departure the character of the remedy
requested. Petitioner, "in order to prevail, must show that as a matter
MASs. GEx. LAWs (1932) c. 140, § 5.
xi.Id. at §6.
12. Id. at § 9.
13. Id. at § 2.
10.

14. The single justice is a member of the Supreme Judicial Court assigned to circuit duty. Petitioner requested of the single justice fourteen rulings of law, two of
which were granted, while the remaining were denied as requested, but most were
granted as modified by the judge.
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of law it is entitled to such license, or that in refusing to grant the
license the respondents have proceeded upon grounds erroneous in law
or have otherwise violated legal rights of the petitioner". 15 As to the
scope of its review, the court held that "the general finding of the
single justice in favor of the respondents imports a finding of all the
incidental and subsidiary facts necessary to that conclusion permissible
on the evidence". 16 More specifically, "the question presented on this
branch of the case is whether the decision of the single justice can be
supported as matter of law upon any rational view of the evidence.
That decision is not reviewed or revised, but is conclusive if supported
by evidence". 7
Turning to the evidence, the court took cognizance of the following records of the respondents. The crucial vote had been passed
"after taking into consideration all of the angles under Chapter I4o",' s
and in response to the motion that the application in question "be
denied on the ground that the public good did not require it and that
serving meals in the same room where the sale of merchandise is
actively carried on is detrimental to the public health". Under the
same date there was another entry: "The Board feels also that on
account of so many common victualler's licenses, consideration should
be given to those who do a regular restaurant business and nothing
else, and have expensive equipment and pay the city extra money in
taxes and license fees, and so forth." Finally, there was a notation
on the record book of the respondents carrying the same date as the
vote: "Place of service, poor. So-called kitchen in cellar where food
was prepared and sent upstairs by dumb lift. Day light very poor."
On this point, one of the respondents had also given testimony 19
15. The court referred to Crocker v. Justices of the Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162,

164, 165, 94 N. E. 369, 371 (1911); Knights v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 236
Mass. 336, 337, 128 N. E. 637 (192o) ; Milton v. Auditor of the Commonwealth, 244
Mass. 93, 96, 138 N. E. 589, 590 (1923) ; Madden v. Board of Election Commissioners,
251 Mass. 95, 101, 146 N. E. 280, 282 (1925).

16. Italics supplied. The Court referred to Blake v. Hammersley, 288 Mass. 247,
249, 192 N. E. 506, 507 (1934).

17. Italics supplied.

The court referred to Andrews v. Registrars of Voters of

Easton, 246 Mass. 572, 576, 141 N. E. 507, 5o8 (1923) ; Moss v. Old Colony Trust Co.,
246 Mass. 139, 143, 14o N. E. 803, 804 (1923) ; Swift v. Registrars of Voters of Quincy,
281 Mass. 271, 284, 183 N. E. 730, 735 (1932). These three decisions contain, with

minor modification, formulations identical with that quoted above.
18. MASs. GEN. LAws (1932) C. 140.
1g. He testified in part as follows: "Prior to denying the license the board had
some information concerning the physical aspects of the . . . premises. This information was confirmed by an inspection made after the proceeding was commenced.
With regard to the . . . store, the portion of the cellar in which food was prepared
was not partitioned off from the storage places and the rest of the cellar, and a sink and
an open trap near the sink down which waste water came was in the cellar, which waste
water emptied into the trap and was carried off through the sewer. . . . The inspection confirmed the opinion of the board with regard to sanitary conditions which were
considered unfavorable for the preparation of food. There is no daylight in the cellar
and the ventilation was very poor. The character of the food was limited, there was
no stock of fresh meats and the storeroom contained mostly canned material. There
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aimed at establishing the fact that the Board, in making its decision,
had taken into consideration the "physical aspects" of the premises.
Other evidence, however, tended to show that petitioner's place of
business was "inevery way fit for the conduct of a restaurant". On
this latter evidence, the court did not express itself; in its own words,
"that evidence need not be narrated because the single justice was not
20
bound to give it credence".
Disposing of petitioner's attack on the constitutionality of the
statute,21 the court concerned itself with the relationship of the evidence to the decision of the single justice. "His general finding in
favor of the respondents may have rested" 22 on the ground that petitioner's place of business was "unsanitary and not suitable for the
preparation and sale of food". He "may also have found that it was
detrimental to the public health to serve food for immediate consump23
tion in the room where the sale of merchandise was in progress".
He "may further have found that the decision of the respondents was
supported by the facts that too many places had been licensed for
public eating houses and that the welfare of the community would be
promoted by diminishing that number, and that the methods of business
of the petitioner conduced to impair the quality of food dispensed at
all such places". 2 4 Under the circumstances, "it cannot be held that
any of these findings was without support in evidence". As to their
was a toilet at the foot of the stairs about five feet from the sewer pipe which ran
directly into the drain pipe from the sink. It confirmed the opinion that we had that
the sanitary conditions were not right for the preparation of food and that fact was to
be considered as a vital fact in coming to that opinion. In addition, the board felt that to
serve food in a drug store with all sorts of drugs and possible poisons and acids and so
forth was not proper, where people were coming in and general merchandising was
being carried on. The board needed to consider the number of licenses in North
Adams because under the conditions of today it felt that the number was seriously
handicapping each one of them that was doing business and that it was decreasing their
business. The board also felt and took into consideration in reaching its conclusion
that [the store] was selling meals at very nominal sums and in this way was forcing
competitors to curtail the quality of their goods." Petitioner, on the other hand, averred
that the Board had granted a number of licenses to local residents who had entered
business after the petitioner. Petitioner also stated that the Board had renewed all
licenses other than those for the two chain store corporations.
2o. Italics supplied.
21. In its brief for the Supreme Judicial Court, petitioner devoted most of the
space to arguing the unconstitutionality of the statute. This question is discussed in

Part III of the brief (pp. 20-72). The question of "abuse of power" is referred to once
in passing. It may be remarked that this space allocation reflects the inadequate consideration which the courts accord customarily to the latter issue. Redress is sought
primarily in assailing the constitutionality of the statute or ordinance under which the
licensing authorities operate. Elimination of the statute or ordinance as an essential byproduct of redress in an individual dispute is a socially uneconomical procedure.
22. Italics supplied. Liggett Drug Co. v. Board of License Comm'rs, 4 N. E. (2d)
628, 634 (Mass. 1936).
23. Italics supplied. The court in this connection cited with approval In re Interrogatories of the Governor, 97 Colo. 587, 595, 52 P. (2d) 663, 667 (1935), quoting from
it the statement that "the preparation and service of meals, in the same room where the
sale of merchandise is actively carried on, is inimical to the public health".
24. Italics supplied.
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legal significance, "each one of them appears to be a reasonable and
nondiscriminatory test. No one appears to be designed to operate
against the petitioner on grounds of prejudice, or whim, or caprice.
The record does not show that the respondents were actuated by any
unworthy motives".
The court reenforced its deduction by reference to two rulings
granted by the single justice at the request of the petitioner. The first
of these stated: "To refuse to renew a common victualler's license to
a petitioner, otherwise qualified, on grounds other than a failure to
comply with G. L. c. 14o (Ter. Ed.) § 6, or other than because it has
done or is. doing business in an illegal or unsanitary manner, is improper and illegal." 25 The second ruling said: "To refuse to grant or
renew a common victualler's license to a petitioner otherwise qualified,
on the ground that the petitioner does not pay local taxes on real
estate, is improper and illegal." The court saw in the granting of
the first ruling an indication of the single justice's finding that the
refusal of the respondents "was based on sound, practical grounds".
Concerning the second ruling, the court concluded: "Having thus instructed himself as matter of law the action of the single justice in
dismissing the petitions imports a finding that the respondents did not
refuse to grant or renew a common victualler's license to the petitioner
on the ground stated." As a result, the court overruled petitioner's
exceptions.
A critique of the decision, to which we intend to return in the
concluding observations of this paper, could perhaps confine itself to
the commonplace comment that in the field of actions at law the scope
of review on the part of the appellate court is essentially limited. The
limitations were outlined by the Supreme Judicial Court in unequivocal
terms at the very outset of its decision. Speaking generally, the court
defined its function without error; nor do its formulations warrant the
charge of excessive narrowness. Yet, the outcome is entirely unsatisfactory for several reasons.
In the first place, the general standards applicable to appellate
jurisdiction are ill suited for cases like the present one. Prima facie,
the facts of the case pointed in the direction of discriminatory action
on the part of the Board. 26 The single justice, dismissing the peti25. Section 6 of the statute refers to the requirements for the common victualler to
have ". . . upon his premises the necessary implements and facilities for cooking,
preparing and serving food for strangers and travelers". MASs. Gm. LAws (1932)
c. 14o, § 6.
26. It is significant that the writer of the Note in (1937) 31 ILL. L. REv. 1o89, without apparent knowledge of the evidence pointing to the chain-store question as the chief
issue, reports the case under the subtitle: "Licensing as a Method of Destroying the
Chain Store".
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tion, "on the merits" without making findings of facts, contributed
little to clarify the legal situation. The Supreme Judicial Court in
effect restricted itself to supporting hypothetically the conceivable
hypotheses of the single justice. In the last analysis, the decision
comes close to certifying a carte blanwhe for the local licensing author2
ities. 7
Second, the decision does not demonstrate a full comprehension
of the legal problems involved in judicial review of administrative
discretion. It goes without saying that administrative discretion operates solely within the framework of its authorization. Each administrative act, to be lawful, must maintain a discernible nexus with the
general norm conferring the discretionary power. The existence of
such a nexus is in itself a question of law. In this criterion alone lies
the distinction between lawful exercise of discretionary power and
arbitrariness. The distinction is to a large extent identical with that
between proper and improper motivation of the discretionary act. The
court progresses into the vicinity of these categories by affirming the
absence of "unworthy" motives. But a "worthy" motive is by no
means always a proper motive in terms of the nexus criterion. Discretion does not mean freedom to pursue any public purpose. 28 Reference to the "public good" in the statute directs discretionary contemplation to two areas only: personal disqualification and local need.
The former includes the actual conduct of the business; the latter
points to the concrete pattern of the community. For the definition
of both areas, the practice of the licensing authority is not irrelevant.
Refusal to renew the license for an enterprise licensed for several years
requires particular scrutiny of the controlling motive.
Third, the three specific considerations attributed to the single
justice, each of which was pronounced by the court to be a "reasonable and nondiscriminatory test", are too broad to permit segregation
into proper and improper motives. As to the "physical aspects" of
the premises, no attempt was made to ascertain whether or not the
actual arrangements in petitioner's store had been part of the Board's
official knowledge prior to the granting of the last license. The same
question arises with respect to the general conclusion that serving food
in a room where merchandise is also being sold is "detrimental to the
public health". Since the Board had obviously not been controlled by
this conclusion in renewing the license in previous years, the change
27. Under the circumstances, "fixing" the licensing authority is the only way out

in similar cases-a strange consequence under the "rule of law".

28. In its brief for the Supreme Judicial Court, petitioner barely touched upon this
issue. Cf. supra note 21. The explanation probably lies, at least in part, in the discouragingly narrow precedential basis for the line of reasoning presented in the text.
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of mind should call for a special explanation. 29 The evidence contains
no concrete facts to justify the change of mind. Similarly, concerning
petitioner's ability to sell meals "at very nominal sums"

3

because of

its chief reliance on the sale of merchandise, the "combined" character
of the business was neither a new discovery nor does it in itself warrant the finding that petitioner "conduced to impair the quality of
food dispensed at all [eating] places". Finally, the fact that "too many
places had been licensed" does not entitle the Board to pick its victim
freely and thus to save itself from the consequences of its own licensing
policy. The court fails to indicate a rational standard for the actual
choice.
II

Before progressing further with the analysis, let us now place side
by side with this decision a French case. 31 What should perhaps be
emphasized is that the Conseil d' tat based its decision on the official
files (dossier) of the public authority involved-standard practice in
French administrative justice. The facts of the case as reported here
are summarized from the dossier.3 2 Availability of the official files is
of particular importance in ascertaining the motivation of discretionary
acts. Little room is left for guesswork if the court of review is placed
in a position to follow through the processes leading up to the making
of the administrative decision.
In 19o8, the municipality of Cannes authorized, on an experimental basis, the stationing of twelve de luxe automobiles for public
use in front of the Municipal Casino. The automobiles received a
number each, like horse-drawn cabs, and had to pay an annual stand
fee of ioo francs; the maximum fare for any trip was fixed at 2o
francs. This arrangement continued until the beginning of the winter
season of 1913-1914, but it did not meet with public favor. Consequently, the authorization given to the owners of the twelve cars was
not renewed, and the numbers were withdrawn. 33 The decision of
29. Section 9 of the statute contains the following clause: "If a licensee at any
time conducts his licensed business in an improper manner, the licensing authorities,
after notice to the licensee and reasonable opportunity for a hearing, may upon satisfactory proof thereof suspend or revoke the license." MAss. GEN. LAWS (932) c. 140,
§ 9. Although the question of "improper conduct" did not arise in the instant case, the
quoted clause offers a lead in the direction suggested in the text.
3o. Thus the testimony of one of the respondents. See supra note ig.
31. Conseil d'P-tat, June 8, 1917 (Ville de Cannes c. Rab6), Sirey i92o, III, I.
32. Cf. 2 HAURIOU, LA JURISPRUDENCE ADMINISTRATIVE DE 1892 A 1929 (1929) 343
et seq. On the historical development of French administrative justice cf. RIESENFELD,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 55 et seq. A useful compilation of the literature on French
administrative law and justice is offered therein, id. at 55, n. 5o. On the scope of the

doctrine of "abuse of power" (d6tournement de pouvoir), particularly important in the
control of administrative discretion, cf. id. at 425-426.
33. No litigation resulted from this measure. It must be kept in mind that the
numbers were granted provisionally, subject to the termination of the "experiment".
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the municipality was governed by the thought that, in view of the
competition suffered by the street cars, it was inopportune to increase
permanently the number of vehicles available for public use.
In its meeting of September 24, 1913, the municipal council voted
to invite the owners of horse-drawn cabs in possession of numbers
to change to taxicabs, as contrasted with de luxe automobiles, provided that at least ten would effect this change. Those substituting
taxicabs for horse-drawn cabs soon exceeded ten. In October, the
mayor, in exercise of his ordinance-making power,34 adopted a regulation concerning the operation of these taxicabs. Section I6 of the
ordinance placed the taxicabs under the same rules as were in effect
for horse-drawn cabs, providing also that the former could use the
stands available for the latter.
The net result of these measures35 was that those owning horsedrawn cabs at the time of the council's vote obtained a monopoly. On
the one hand, the number of cabs was not to be increased; on the
other hand, only the existing cabs in possession of a number could
change to automobile operation. Besides, the cab owners were organized in a trade association. Thus the Cab Owners Association
became what amounted to a closed corporation, vested exclusively with
the right to use the public stands not only for horse-drawn cabs but
also automobile taxis.
In January, 1914, plaintiff applied to the mayor for authorization
to operate for public use one of the original de luxe cars which he
claimed to have acquired. His request was based 3 6 on the fact that
the car had been one of the ten operating under a number up to 1913.
The Cab Owners Association protested. The mayor refused the application on the ground that the municipality did not intend to increase
the number of vehicles available for public use. He added, however,
that if plaintiff became the owner of one of the existing cabs, the
municipality would be willing to transfer the number of the cab to him.
Plaintiff brought suit against the municipality.
The Conseil d'.-tat annulled the decision of the mayor. It pointed
out that under the laws the authority of the municipality was confined
in this matter to the maintenance of public order and the regulation
of traffic (le bon ordre et la circulation). It declared the restrictions
put into effect by the mayor in consequence of the council- vote "in34. For the statutory basis of this ordinance-making power, see the reasons given
in the decision of the Conseil d'tat, below. The powers of mayors are enumerated
in the Loi sur l'organization inunicipale of April 5, i884 (28 BULLErIN DEs Lois 369)
§ 73 et seq.
35. Cf. 2 HAuRioU, op. cit. supra note 32, at 345.
36. Legally, the reason advanced was not conclusive. See supra note 33. The Consell d' tat did not concern itself with this reason in its decision. In his comment,
Hauriou pays no attention to it. 2 HAuRiou, op. cit. supra note 32, at 345.
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spired by interests other than those of public order and traffic control". It pronounced plaintiff "entitled to maintain that, in applying
these measures to him and in refusing to issue a number for the car
owned by him", the mayor had used his powers "for a purpose other
than that with regard to which they were granted him". In this
"discreet" 37 formulation, the decision indicates the distinction between
proper and improper motivation, without concerning itself directly with
the issue raised by the monopolistic structure of the Cab Owners Association. Indirectly, however, the decision effectively disposes of the
monopoly.
In its tenor, the decision is in harmony with precedent. In the
Bouclwrdon case 38 the Conseil d'etat had laid down the rule that
municipal authorities cannot lawfully regulate vehicles for public use
in such a way as to establish virtually a monopoly for one particular
entrepreneur. The present decision, however, extends further. Instead
of protecting the interests of a particular entrepreneur, the mayor's
action in effect sustained the collective interests of the Cab Owners
Association. The decision makes plain that the same considerations
governing the factual monopoly of a single entrepreneur apply to the
monopole de fait of an association of entrepreneurs pursuing its occupational group interests. 39 In other words, it is a discriminatory test
to condition the admission of a vehicle for public use upon the applicant's membership in a trade association. Under such a practice, the
trade association would obtain semi-public character (crgation indirecte
de corporationmunicipale). In the present case, access to membership
was open only to the purchaser of one of the existing cabs. By suggesting this avenue to plaintiff, the mayor made himself the representative of the interests of the Cab Owners Association. His action
was incompatible with his status as an administrative officer exercising
regulatory powers defined by both the statutes governing municipal
authorities and the general principle of freedom of competition, recognized in French law.
The decision of the Conseil d']tat reflects an inclination, manifest
throughout the realm of French administrative justice to protect intentionally or unintentionally the competitive interests of the small-scale
entrepreneur. 40 The decision also mirrors the widespread fear of
37. Id. at 346.
38. Conseil d' tat, Aug. 2, 187o, Sirey 1872, II, 288.
39. 2 HAURIOU, op. cit. supra note 32, at 346.
4o. A good illustration of this tendency is the recently advanced (but not yet seriously pursued) project for what amounts to a "small NRA" for minor and middle-sized
enterprises. The plan is most sensitive to the independence of individual enterprise.
It is outlined in Coutrot, Proposalsfor a Law on Industrial and Commercial Organizato, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT CONGRESS, GENERAL
MANAGEMENT PAPERS (1938) 29 et seq. Cf. Morstein Marx, National and Economic
Significance of Scientific Management (Rapporteur's Critique) id. at Ia et seq.
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syidicalisme, whether in the form of employee organizations or that
41
of trade associations. Hauriou, in his comment on the decision,
emphasizes the statutory basis of the "freedom of commerce and industry", one of the accomplishments of the French Revolution. If
there be syndicalisine, he argues, it must find its foundation in new
legislation. In the absence of such legislation, it cannot be the task
of the police authorities to proceed without express authorization. To
him, the decision suggests the following rules. First, qualified by
"reasons of public order of absolute necessity", the municipal police
power does not extend to "organizing in corporations42 the industries
which touch upon the traffic on public roads". Second, the municipal
police power may not attempt to reach the same result "by resorting
to some detour device". Any approach toward setting up a public
utility of this character should be in the form of a direct and straightforward "rglement de principe", subject to attack before the administrative courts. Such a r~glernent de principe had been approved by the
Conseil d'.tat in the Boudhir case. 43 In that case the mayor had established on the municipal market square a corps of porters placed under
the orders of a manager, reserving for himselfthe supervision of the
enterprise.
Hauriou's conclusion deserves citation in full: "The municipality
of Cannes had observed neither the one nor the other of the two conditions. On the one hand, no absolute necessity of public order could
have required the limitation of the number of vehicles for public use
and the organization of those existing in an enterprise vested with a
quasi-official status. On the other hand, the combination of the owners
in a corporationmunicipale 44 had been the result of indirect measures.
The combination sprang from the fact that the owners themselves
were organized and that the municipality responded to their suggestions in refusing the admission of new vehicles. This was a corporation de fait, a shameful creation, 45 to which the Conseil d'Atat could
not concede juridical existence." 46 One may add that French administrative justice is not sympathetic toward the clandestine formation by municipalities of economic satellites which are not placed in
a clear legal relationship to the statutory basis of municipal authority.
The Conseil d'Atat, reconstructing the concrete situation from
the official files of the municipality, did not confine itself to an inquiry
41. 12 HAUmlOU, op. cit. supra note 32, at 347.

42. In the sense of French legal terminology.

43. Conseil d'Petat, Dec. 9, 19o4, Sirey 19o6, III, 154.
44. In the sense of French legal terminology, meaning a corporate body organized
by a municipality.
45. Hauriou's words are "une corporation honteuse".
46. 12 HAtRIOU, op. cit. supra note 32, at 347-348.
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into the good faith of the mayor. It did not restrict the area of its
review to the question whether or not "practical grounds" or "worthy
motives" had governed the mayor's action. It would be extravagant
to call the mayor's action "impractical" or guided by "unworthy"
motives. The decisive criterion was that of the nexus between the
refusal of plaintiff's request and the statutory foundation of the
mayor's authority. His restrictive measures, in the words of the
Conseil d'A-tat, were not "inspired" by considerations of public order
and traffic regulation. They had resulted from considerations of official convenience: to work out a local arrangement of apparent practicality. The arrangement, however, transcended the mayor's authority
because of its discriminatory effect. Police measures may qualify the
"freedom of commerce and industry", but their character. and scope
must be justified by a direct "police interest". The specific nature of
the regulation effected by the mayor of Cannes could not be retraced
to such a direct "police interest". As a consequence, although in good
faith and motivated by administratively "sound" reasons, he had acted
outside the bounds of the law.
The case demonstrates two things. In the first place, French
administrative justice does not attempt to review discretion by focusing on the question whether or not the statute sets forth sufficiently
concrete criteria to guide administrative action. 47 Under modern conditions, emphasis on such express criteria is bound to operate on the
unrealistic imputation of legislative omniscience. In contrast with
this emphasis, French decisions derive implicit criteria of proper administrative motivation from the controlling statutory clause, and
hence review discretion in terms of its individual manifestations. Second, in doing so the Conseil d'tat, scrutinizing the official records,
treats the existence of the nexus between authorization and execution
as a question of law. Instead of entertaining more or less artificial
hypotheses, it instructs itself fully as to the relevant facts, thus placing
itself in a position to clarify the legal situation in its entirety. As a
result, French administrative law, in the happy phrase of Berth6lemy,
48
has become "a real equity".

III

While in France the unity of administrative law is preserved by
the central position of the Conseil d'etat, Republican Germany, like
the pre-war Kaiserreich, lacked a National Supreme Administrative
47. With respect to ordinance-making powers, the American doctrine is stated in
very broad terms in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935). Cf. Jacoby,

loc. cit. supra note 4, for a comparative analysis.
48. Berthdlemy, The Conieil d'etat in France

INTERNiAT. LAW 23, 32.

(193o)

12 J. ComP.
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Court. The Weimar Constitution, however, envisaged an organizationally integrated system of administrative adjudication, 49 although
it retained the federal structure of government. Each state maintained its own machinery of administrative justice. As to the concepts and principles of the substantive law, on the other hand, the
administrative courts, national and state, treated the precedents of
different jurisdictions and the writings of the authorities as part and
parcel of one common body of legal rules. On certain points, doctrinal
differences could arise. But these were the exception, and did not
seriously affect the general pattern.
Under the laws of the state of Hamburg, the acquisition by corporations of real estate exceeding in value a defined minimum was
conditioned on the consent of the Department of Justice. The statute
further provided that the consent was subject to a fee of one per cent
of the assessed value of the property. In introducing the bill in the
state assembly, the cabinet had given two reasons for the proposed
legislation. The first was that the growing housing shortage made it
imperative to take "all steps" that seemed appropriate to meet the
situation. The second was that measures were required to combat
the ill effects of increasing control of real estate by foreigners who
utilized the device of German straw corporations in order to circumvent the legal barriers blocking their direct acquisition of properties.5°
Plaintiff, a large Hamburg shipping enterprise, having bought a
property exceeding in value the legal minimum, applied for consent.
The Department of Justice intimated that there were no particular
objections to the transaction, but that consent, in harmony with its
established practice, would be given only if plaintiff, apart from the
fee, would contribute a specified sum to the Housing Fund adminis-.
tered by the Housing Commissioner. Plaintiff replied that it did not
consider itself obligated to comply with this demand, but that it would
be willing to pay without prejudice to its right to appeal to the courts.
After payment, consent was given. By its subsequent suit, plaintiff
49. Article 107 of the Weimar Constitution provided that "in the Reich and in the
states there must exist, in accordance with the laws, administrative courts for the protection of individuals against orders and decrees of administrative authorities". On
these courts, national and state, see Uhlman and Rupp, loc. cit. supra note 4. In the
Third Reich, the jurisdiction of the administrative courts has been limited by the exemption of the so-called "political" measures from judicial review. Otherwise, the
system of administrative justice has been retained without substantial impairments. Cf.
id. at 1045-1046; MORSTEIN MARx, GOVERxmENT IN THE THIRD REIcH (2d ed. 1937)
144 et seq. Ipsen, op. cit. supra note 4, at 275 et seq., proposes to solve all political conflicts by recognizing the right of the government to preclude from administrative litigation any individual measures declared by the government to be fraught with political
connotations.
5o. In this respect, the act (passed in 1920) attempted to check the tendency of
foreign interests to utilize the post-war currency inflation in Germany for securing
economic values at a price often hardly more than nominal.
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attempted to recover the sum contributed to the Housing Fund. The
suit was successful. 5 1
The administrative court, being the court of first resort, 52 concluded from the silence of the statute that it had left the determination
of the conditions under which the consent was to be given to the discretion of the Department of Justice. "Hence defendant, generally
speaking, is entitled to attach to the consent certain conditions or
specific stipulations. It goes, however, without saying that defendant
must observe defined limits, and that it may not abuse its power in
this respect." Citing with approval one authority, 53 the court summarized the principles governing the exercise of administrative discretion to the effect that "it would be an illicit transgression of the
bounds of discretion, hence abuse of discretion, hence unlawful action, if the exercise of discretion were determined by extraneous considerations, and further, that in each single case the department in
exercising its discretion may take cognizance of only those factors
which the statute intends to be considered in a case of this kind".
In accordance with the principles enunciated, the court turned to
the question 54 of whether or not "the demand of a special levy, besides the fee provided in the statute, is encompassed by the purpose
of the statute". Reviewing the legislative history of the statute, the
court satisfied itself that in the enforcement of housing and rent legislation frequent difficulties had arisen from the complexities of corporate management in cases where the responsible landlord was a
corporation; the statute was designed to eliminate such difficulties in
the future by giving an opportunity to check the acquisition of real
estate by corporations. The second dominant consideration had been
the thought of protecting real estate against the inroads of foreigners.
In the light of its findings, the court declared the dual purpose of the
statute "clearly discernible". It proclaimed defendant "forced to keep
within the bounds thus drawn in the administration of the statute".
51. Hamburg Administrative Court, Aug. 18, 1924 (1925) 8 Hanseatische RechtsZeitschrift i3o; Hamburg Supreme Administrative Court, Nov. 5, 1924, 8 Hanseatische
Rechts-Zeitschrift 132.
52. The text of the Hamburg Administrative Judicature Act is reprinted in somewhat abridged form in Morstein Marx, Die Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsrechtsentwickhlng in den drei Hansestidten Hamburg, Bremen und Liibeck, 1918-1928 (1928) I6

et seq.
53. Perels, Darf die Verwaltungsbehirdedie Erteilung einer it ihr freies Ermessen
gelegten Genehmigung von der Zahung einer gesetzlich nicht vorgesienen "Gebiihr"
JAHRBUCH DES OEFENTLICHEN RECHTS 51, 75

6 ARcHlv DES OEFFENTLICHEN REcHTs (NEW~ SERIES) 93, 97.
54. The court correctly considered this question a question of public law. In elaborating this point in its decision, it cited with approval Morstein Marx, Zur Lehre voin
Erstattungsanspruch bei Ungiiltigkeit der schuldbegriindenden Rechtsnorm (1924) 7
abhiingigmachen? (1924)

HANSEATISCHE RECHTS-ZEITSCHRIFT 527, 534-535.
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By transcending the limits indicated, defendant had "committed an
abuse of discretion and hence an illegal act".

5

No legal significance was attributed by the court to the fact that
the printed justification of the bill, as distributed for the use of the
legislative assembly, had referred to the necessity of taking "'all steps"
appropriate to mitigate the housing shortage. Defendant had argued
that this language offered a basis for its demand since the demand,
made always in agreement with the Housing Commissioner, aimed at
mitigating the housing shortage. The court declared defendant's interpretation erroneous. It pointed out that the language was merely
of an introductory character, containing no specific information as to
the concrete purposes pursued by the bill. The court substantiated its
own view also by reference to the statute itself. The provision relating
to the imposition of fees was cited as evidence that the statute concerned itself with the scope of plaintiff's financial obligations. In the
absence of any other indication, the court saw in the provision an
"exhaustive regulation".
On the defendant's appeal, the State Supreme Administrative
Court 51 affirmed the decision. In the main, it confined itself to supplementing the reasons of the court of first resort. It entertained no
doubt as to the lack of a legal foundation for any levies in connection
with the administrative transaction in question, in addition to the
statutory fee. It prefaced the body of its decision 57 by commenting
on the content of the official document issued by defendant. Technically, the consent had not contained any condition. It had been
given in unqualified form. "Prior to issuing it, the Department of
Justice has demanded payment of an amount of money. Plaintiff has
paid the amount, and the Department of Justice has received it, under
the condition that the courts should determine the validity of the
demand. The demand was without any justification. The Department of Justice itself has not been able to offer any ground on which it
could base the validity of the demand." 58
Nor would the legal situation be different if defendant had explicitly conditioned the consent upon the payment of an amount of
55. The conclusion is supported by recognized doctrine. "Abuse of discretion is
legally equal to excess of discretion." FLEINER, INSTITUTIONEN DES DEUTSCHEN VERVALTUNGSRECHTS (8th ed. 1928) 146.
56. It may be mentioned that the Hamburg Supreme Administrative Court served
also, on the basis of a compact between the three states of Hamburg, Bremen and
Lfibeck, as the appellate tribunal for administrative law cases arising in the other two
states.
57. In passing, the Supreme Administrative Court disposed of the idea that the

"established practice" of the Department of justice could be invoked as the legal basis
for the demand addressed to plaintiff.
58. Cf. i MAYER, DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSRECHT (3d ed. 1924) 25o, n. 18.
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money. 59 "The statute confers on the Department of Justice the discretionary power to grant or to deny corporations the consent to
acquire real estate. It does not determine, nor even suggest, the
criteria which should guide the Department in the exercise of this
discretion. Under the circumstances, it is not permissible in defining
those considerations relevant to the Department's decision on applications for consent to attach any significance to the legislative justification for the bill-quite apart from the general rule that the motivation
of the lawmaking body may be utilized for the construction of statutes
only with caution. The point of departure must be that administrative agencies are always under the obligation to bring the public
interest to bear upon their action; that hence an administrative agency
authorized by statute to grant or refuse a consent, without express
criteria for its decision, has to derive its standards from the public
interest-the public interest in its full meaning, but at the same time
the public interest exclusively; that hence, and with regard to the
present case, the Department of Justice must refuse the consent if the
real estate acquisition is contrary to the public interest-the general
interest in the promotion of housing or the preservation of German
control of real estate, or another general interest; that on the other
hand the consent must be given if the real estate acquisition is not
contrary to the public interest, or even serves the public interest." 60
The effect of this deduction is both far-reaching and obvious.
Administrative discretion, instead of giving leeway for choice, is being
resolved into a set of official obligations."' "In the present case, the
public interest, if not served by the real estate acquisition, has certainly
not been disadvantaged or endangered by it-a fact not contested by
the Department of Justice. Consequently, the consent had to be given,
and its refusal would have been an obvious abuse of the discretionary
power conferred upon the Department by the statute. In particular,
the Department was not authorized to capitalize on the extensive power
placed in its hands, even if it were for an entirely laudable purpose, by
making the granting of the consent dependent upon the payment of an
amount of money. The statute and its purposes do not suggest the
slightest indication of a legal basis for such a demand. It may be
added that there would have been no reason whatever for authorizing
this kind of action. In the first place, one simply cannot conceive of
59. For a similar case, see Bavarian Oberstes Landesgericht, Mar. 26, 1912, 33
Reger's Entscheidungen der Gerichte und Verwaltungsbeh6rden 27.
6o. "Truly free discretion, i. e., discretion dependent solely on volition, does not
exist in the sphere of public administration, but only discretion according to official
duties." SCHELCHER, JUSTIZ UND VERWALTUNG (1919) 42.
61. "The authorization to exercise free discretion does not embrace the freedom to
act arbitrarily." Prussian Supreme Administrative Court, Apr. 27, x88r, 7 Entscheidungen des Preussischen Oberverwaltungsgerichts 3o6.

COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

any ground for burdening corporations acquiring real estate with a
tithe considered justified by the Department, in addition to the general
levies and costs attending real estate acquisitions, which are at present
extremely high. Second, it would be impossible to assume that a well
ordered polity should attempt to balance its budget with revenues the
amount of which is determined by the changing ideas entertained by
an administrative agency, affected in turn by the changes in the ,responsible personnel." 62
In view of the facts of the case, the State Supreme Administrative
Court saw no reason to address itself to the question whether or not
the legal situation would be different if plaintiff had yielded to the
demand of the Department of Justice and paid the demanded sum of
money without reserving its rights. The guiding principles to be
applied to such circumstances, however, are not ambiguous. They
may be summed up as follows: "In the sphere of administrative law,
the fundamental rule is recognized that administrative agencies may
not attempt to realize ends denied them under the principles of public
law by resort to the detour device of private agreement with the citizen.
It is correct to say that no administrative agency may bargain with
the citizen for such special rights within its functional province, in
terms of a civil law contract, as do not flow from the general public
law relationship between administrative authority and the individual
subject to it, and hence are encompassed by this relationship." 03
The practical importance of these principles is self-evident. "It
accords with the wisely considered intention that administrative law,
in regulating the relationship between administrative authority and
the individual, tries to preserve the very idea of law by establishing
strict delimitations. In the field of German police law, the administrative courts, faced with a general clause authorizing police action,
have prudently developed the counterpart of a detailed system of legal
barriers to this authority. The doctrine qualifying the exercise of
discretion and defining the concept of abuse of discretion rests in the
last analysis on nothing else but the endeavor to place emphasis on
the idea of law in the face of authority, and thus to serve the needs
of the citizen by marking out the boundaries of administrative concern. What is involved here is the maintenance of an equilibrium in
the vital relationship between government and the individual, and
62. Cf.

JELLINEc, GEsErz, GESETZESANWENDUNG UND ZWECKMIASSIEIuTSER1VX-

340 et seq., 348 et seq.
63. Morstein Marx, Die "Offentliche Hand" als privatrechtlich organisierteStaatsverwaltung (1929) 12 HANSEATISCHE RECIITS- UND GERICHTS-ZEITSCHRIFT 587, 5)4.
Cf. FLEiNEE, op. cit. supra note 55, at 147-148; 1 MAYER, op. cit. supra note 58, at 98,
GUNG (913)

1o8, 254.
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therefore one of the fundamental problems of political organization
itself." 64
Free resort to private agreements under civil law by administrative agencies would defeat the cardinal objective of administrative
law. "The greater elasticity of civil law means for all practical purposes a widened authorization for public administration, an uncontemplated accrual of power, without a corresponding counterpoise in
favor of the citizen as an individual. Therein lies a danger not to be
underestimated because the consequent expansion of administrative
power appears almost boundless. The danger can be met only by a
determined throttling of government activities parading in the disguise
of civil law. Without such throttling, the system of public law would
lose its significance." 65
IV
Of French administrative law, it can well be said that "it appears
founded on the prerogative of the individual".6 6 For decades, the
Conseil d'Atat has given the concept of excess of power "a very broad
construction" so as to make it "synonymous with abuse of power".67
Beyond the Rhine, prior to the advent of the Third Reich, German
administrative law reflected in its application the principle that "the
presumption is in favor of the citizen's freedom from governmental
68

coercion".

Today, National Socialist doctrine is eating holes into the texture
of the substantive law. For the Secret Police it has been claimed that
"the scope of political considerations, i. e., the factors touching upon
the vital interests of the national community and hence belonging to
the competence of the Secret Police, cannot be determined rationally,
but can be determined only for each single case by the Secret Police
itself". 69

The change of emphasis, however, does not dispose of the

comparative significance of the German system of administrative law
developed under the auspices of the Second Reich and perfected further
during the republican era, particularly since German theory and practice has displayed greater responsiveness to French precedent than was
64. MORSTEIN MARX, op. cit. supra note 63, at 595.
65. Id. at 595-596. Cf. FLEINE, op. cit. supra note 55, at 126.
66. 2 MESTRE, I LIMITI DEL SINDICATO CONTENZIOSO NEI RIGUARDI DEGLI ATTI DELL'AUTORITA AMMINISTRATIVA, STUDI DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO IN ONORE DI ORESTE RANELLETTI
(1931) 133, 142.
67. SERRIGNY, TRAIT DE L'ORGANIZATION DE LA COMP-TENCE ET DE LA PROCEDURE
EN MATIERE CONTENTIEUSE ADMINISTRATIVE (I865) 309. Cf. RIESENFELD, Op. Cit. supra

note 4, at 425-426.

68. FLEiNER, op. cit. supra note 55, at 131, 389.
69. Hamel, Die Polizei im Nationalsozialistischen Stoat (1935) 40 DEUTSCHE
JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 326, 330. The author derives encouragement from some of the more
recent decisions of the Italian Consiglio di Stato without quite grasping the significance
of these decisions.
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the case vice versa.7 0 Under the Weimar Constitution, no exaggeration was involved in the statement that both legal authorities and
administrative courts were "in unqualified agreement" as to the legal
principles relating to administrative discretion: that "even free discretion must always be exercised solely as discretion according to
official duties; that it is an illegitimate transgression of the bounds of
discretion, consequently an abuse of discretion, therefore illegal action,
if the exercise of free discretion is determined by extraneous considera71
tions".
Continental European administrative law has displayed no eagerness to hold the legislator to the requirement of supplying administrative agencies with unequivocal directives for the exercise of discretionary power. This disinclination has arisen from practical considerations. The modem "service state" assigns to legislative bodies
exacting tasks of unprecedented magnitude and complexity. Sheer
pressure of time makes it impossible for the representative assembly
to incorporate into the statute detailed specifications for the methods
and techniques by which the administrator attempts to realize the
statutory objectives. Nor can it be assumed that the lawmaker is
adequately equipped for any such assignments. He is unable to foresee the perplexing questions which may present themselves in the
process of enforcement on the administrative plane; he cannot be expected to meet them in terms of statutory clauses. Moreover, it should
be conceded that the administrator, being on the scene of enforcement
operations, is in a more favorable position to develop an intelligent
approach to the discharge of the function with which the statute entrusts him. 7 2

To effect rational procedure on the administrative level

requires a considerable degree of flexibility of directives. To place
the administrator in a straightjacket of superimposed standards carries
with it the danger of a defeat of the very purpose of the statute. It is
not safe to tie the steering-wheel of the car in order to check extravagant urges of the driver.
In addition, there can be no doubt that it is socially undesirable
to offer redress in individual cases of abuse of discretionary power by
voiding the authorizing statute because of a lack of explicit criteria
7o. Cf. FREUND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 4.

71. Perels, supra note 53, at 97. Cf. Prussian Supreme Administrative Court, Oct.
I, 19o9 (19o9) 55 Entscheidungen des Preussischen Oberverwaltungsgerichts 459;
BUHLER, DIE SUBJEKTIEN OFFENTLICHEN RECHTE

UND IIR SCHUTZ IN DER DEUTSCHEN

VERVALTUNGSRECHTSSPRECHUNG (1914) 24; JELLINEN, Op. cit. supra note 62, at 347;
LAUN, DAS FREIE ERMESSEN rJND SEINE GRENZEN (igio) 262. For relevant decisions
of the Saxon Supreme Administrative Court, see APELT, DAS SXCHSISCHE GESETZ
fUBER DIE VERWALTUNGSGMCHTSBARKEIT (1911) 286. For a corresponding decision of
the Baden Supreme Administrative Court, see BOHLER, op. cit. supra at 163.

72. The same thesis is elaborated from a somewhat different vantage point by
cit. supra note 3.

LANDIS, 70C.
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to guide administrative action. 73 Instead of rectifying the situation
by disposing of the specific administrative act, the court, by declaring
the statute invalid, exceeds by far the necessities of the case. The
result is a legislative vacuum. The outcome is unsatisfactory because
it amounts to a needless waste of community energies. Quite apart
from the thought of social economy, however, the implied rebuke to
the legislator must often appear entirely unwarranted. The interest
of the court in obtaining explicit criteria for the review of discretion
is disproportionate to the difficulties confronting the legislator in
formulating the statute with an eye to fitting it for practical use. It is
hardly surprising that the judiciary is prone to overemphasize those
considerations which tend to simplify judicial business. An express
standard incorporated in the statute offers a handy yardstick for adjudging administrative conduct. But its handiness alone does not
compensate for the substantial disadvantages attending its application.
It is clear, on the other hand, that no administrative agency "can
be permitted simply to follow its own course oriented toward police
state conceptions. The administrative agency is an executor operating
in the name and subject to the instructions of the body politic. In the
discharge of this function, it is dependent on the confidence of those
from whom its mandate is derived: the people". 74 While Continental
European administrative law has abstained from demanding of the
legislative branch legal standardization of administrative conduct in
terms of express stipulations, it has re~nforced public confidence in
the operative establishments of government by developing an extensive
judicial scrutiny of administrative action. In this respect, it has contributed to a practical realization of the representative idea by insuring
full publicity of government transactions. Costs of administrative
litigation are low. Review by administrative courts has not been
allowed to dwell on mere hypotheses of legitimate administrative action. By appeal to the courts, the citizen affected by administrative
measures was given an opportunity to lift the curtain of official
anonymity. The boldness of judicial inquiry was commensurate with
73. A good illustration is petitioner's brief for the Supreme Judicial Court in the
Massachusetts case, see supra note 21. The constitutional argument was presented
under the following headings: "A. The statute deprives petitioner of their property
without due process of law. B. The statute denies petitioner the equal protection of the
law. C. The statute is an unreasonable and unwarranted interference with a lawful
private business." The body of the brief is devoted to an analysis of these propositions.
Cf. Note (1938) 87 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 201. In the Massachusetts case, petitioner placed
chief reliance on Yick Wo v. Hopkins, XI8 U. S. 356 (1886), and, in the words of the
Supreme Judicial Court, "the numerous cases of that class following it." See Liggett
Drug Co., Inc. v. Board of License Com'rs of City of North Adams, 4 N. E. (2d)
628, 635 (Mass. 1936).
74. Morstein Marx, Rechsstaat und Verwaltungsrecht (1929) 87 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR
DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISsENSCHaAr 379, 383.
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the scope of administrative experience on the part of the court membership.75
The decisions here presented (II and III) conceive of administrative discretion as essentially embedded in the legal order. Being
embedded in the legal order, the discretionary act cannot reach beyond
the special purposes which the statute has envisaged in conferring discretionary power. For administrative measures, the claim to compliance rests on their statutory authorization. Benevolence of motive
per se counts for naught. 76 This, in fact, is the distinction between
the police state and the representative polity. Since the grant of discretionary power in effect widens the scope of authorization beyond
explicit statutory clauses, particular care is required to delimit the
borderline between legitimate and illegitimate use of discretionary
power. The legality of the discretionary act is dependent on proper
motivation. The proper motive is identical with that motive which
the statute itself intends to serve. The intention of the statute can be
ascertained from its contents and the context of its legislative deliberation, regardless of the absence of express criteria to govern the exercise of discretion. If there be ground for doubt, the doubt would
point to the illegality of the administrative act. For no administrative
act is valid unless it can be traced back to statutory authorization.
Should the extent of the authorization be in doubt, the administrative
agency concerned would lack a charter of action.
It follows that we cannot speak of abuse of discretion (depriving
the administrative act of legality because of the lack of authorization)
only in those cases where the discretionary act is plainly discriminatory.
Unless a statute in itself constitutional directs him otherwise, the
administrator, acting as the agent of the community, is bound by his
official duty to uphold the generality of the law and the equality of
citizens by granting no one special favors and imposing on no one
special disadvantages. But discrimination is merely the most flagrant
abuse of discretionary power. Surely, if he acts in bad faith he acts
illegally. It does not follow, however, that his good faith can heal
improper motivation. Whether or not his motive is proper is a question of law. It is not a question of the administrator's subjective
conception of propriety. His concern may have been with an "entirely
75. As one who has had an opportunity to plead before German administrative

courts as the designated representative of his department, I may say that, almost without exception, the judges considered themselves obligated to provide the administrative
agency appearing as defendant with a good conception of feasible procedure that would
satisfy all legal requirements.
76. The decision as to what objectives are socially desirable, and as such to be pursued by governmental agencies, is a decision reserved for the representative bodies.
Administrative agencies are not authorized to anticipate such a decision of the policyformulating organs of government by effecting it incidentally in the law-enforcement
process.
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laudable purpose". 7 7 Subjectively, he may have considered it his duty
to act as he did. Even objectively, he may have aimed at "sound" and
"practical" ends.7 8 Still, such motivation is by no means necessarily
identical with proper motivation.
Proper motivation is motivation in accordance with discernible
intentions of the statute. Extraneous considerations are all those considerations outside the discernible intentions of the statute. The test
is not the administrator's good faith. Nor is it general "practicality"
or "soundness" of the objectives sought by him to be attained. The
test is the nexus between the individual discretionary act and any of
those special purposes encompassed in the discernible intentions of
the statute. If the nexus does not exist, the discretionary act is illegal
because of lack of authorization. An illegal administrative act can
not acquire legality by judicial imputation of proper motivation. The
proper motive is the key to the question of legality. The question
can not be decided without an inquiry into the factual situation from
which the contested measure arose. To operate here with assumptions vitiates the idea of law itself. It encourages administrative lawlessness.

79
It is incompatible with the "rule of law".

Continental European administrative justice has extended its inquiries into the administrative process further than have American
courts. In the review of discretion, in particular, it has gone far
toward effecting administrative accountability outside the channels of
legislative and hierarchical (internal) control-an accountability
realized in terms of actio popularis. In performing this function, the
administrative courts have not only built up a comprehensive body of
precedents but have also provided public administration with a strong
legal tradition. 0 The beneficial results were in no small measure the
product of the practical knowledge of the administrative process widely
distributed among the court personnel. Speaking generally, the administrative judiciary has recruited much of its membership from the
administrative ranks. Under the circumstances, judicial rebuke of
77. In the words of the Hamburg Supreme Administrative Court; see supra p. 970.
78. As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court put it; see supra p. 96o.
79. See supra note 27.
8o. In Continental Europe, the teaching approach toward public administration is
primarily through the medium of administrative law. Professor William Anderson,
one of our leading scholars in the field of public administration, has recently been quoted
as "prophesying that in twenty-five years our courses in public administration would be
more like the European ones". Social Science Research Council, Committee on Public
Administration, Legal Aspects of Public Administration (1939) 7. Administrative law,
on the other hand, must preserve, in the words of a German authority, "closest cooperation with its neighbor, public administration". K6ttgen, Aitlgaben und Methoden der
verwaltungsrechtlichen Forschung (1938) 5, II JAHRBUCH FiDR KOMmUNALWISSENSCHAFT 218, 225. French administrative law literature abounds in volumes oriented
toward the needs of administrative practice. A typical contribution of this kind is
HAuRIou, PR-CIS ]LtMENTAIRE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF (4th ed. 1938).
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administrative agencies, while gaining special validity because of the
composition of the bench, was accepted with grace by the administrator as coming from the mouth of his peers.
The greatest importance of administrative law lies in its formative
influence on the very conduct of public administration as a whole. It
cannot fail to shape the "administrative mind". It is bound to translate itself into the techniques of public management.81 This, I think,
is the chief lesson to be drawn from Continental European experience.
The presupposition is, of course, an administrative judiciary both set
off organizationally from the agencies of public administration and
at the same time sufficiently accessible to concern itself with the ordinary run of administrative operations. To be effective, administrative courts must be "average man's courts". In serving as "average
man's courts", they must be placed in a position, in terms of the experience of their personnel, to aid the administrator in mapping his
course in harmony with the standards of legality.
The Logan Bill concerning the establishment of a United States
Court of Appeals for Administration 8 2 is a significant move in the
direction of overcoming the present inadequacies of judicial review
of administrative decisions. It is altogether probable that the thoughts
incorporated in this proposal will fail to elicit legislative action in the
immediate future. Surely, prolonged contemplation has its merits.
The bill, however, deserves commendation for its judicious insistence
on a specially qualified bench.8 3 The wording of the bill makes it plain
that among the court personnel there must be members who are "expert
and experienced in the subject matter", 8 4 and who possess special
qualifications "by way of learning, experience, and special training". 85
It is gratifying also that the bill envisages the establishment of
"divisions" 8 and "sections" 87 of the court so as to allocate special
competence to the individual lines of judicial activity.
The scope of the judicial review function is perhaps defined in
terms too narrow. Section ii reads: "The review of the court shall
be limited to questions of law, and the findings of fact of the commission, administrative authority, or tribunal, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive." No objections would exist, of course,
if the question of law, in controversies arising over the exercise of
discretionary power, would be defined as broadly as is suggested in
81. See supra note 75.
82. Sen. 3676, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.

83. § i (a).

84. § 3 (c).
85. Ibid.

86. § 3 (a) and (b).
87. §3 (c).
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the preceding pages. A constructive feature of the bill is to be found
in the provision for divisions of the court to "hold special sessions in
any part of the United States". 88 Still, I am inclined to believe that
practical necessity would soon point to a supplementation of the court's
work by a system of administrative district courts of first resort.8 9
Should this or a similar bill be adopted, however, the greatest benefit
would lie in the incentive which thereby would be given to state legislation of the same type. It is in the latter sphere that the individual
citizen is least adequately protected against administrative encroachment.
88. § I6.
89. The ambulatory scheme outlined in
PROGRAm,

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL CommITTrE

AmERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ADVANCE
ON ADmINISTRATIVE LAW (1936) 209,

seems to be dictated primarily by the fear of "excessive concentration of power in Washington", to use the phrase of the Committee Recommendations. The decisive practical
reason for organizational deconcentration is the increased accessibility of the organs of
administrative justice.

